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THE SCOPE OF PRNATE SECURITIES LITIGATION: IN 
SEARCH OF LIABILITY STANDARDS FOR 
SECONDARY DEFENDANTS 
jill E. Fisch* 
Recent federal court decisions have struggled to apply the Supreme 
Cowt's decision in Central Bank v. First Interstate to determine when 
outside professionals should be held liable as primary violators under section 
IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. In keeping with the Court's current 
interpretive methodology, Central Bank and its progeny employ a textualist 
approach. In this Article, Professor Fisch argues that literal textualism is an 
inappropriate approach for interpreting the federal securities laws generally 
and misguided in light of legislative developments post-dating the Central 
Bank decision. Instead, Professor Fisch advocates an approach that weighs 
Congress's recent endorsement of liability for outside professionals against the 
potential for litigation abuses perceived by the Central Bank Court. The 
Article concludes that recent federal decisions have been unduly restrictive in 
their interpretation of section 1 O(b) liability, and suggests that courts give 
greater consideration to the nature of the professional-client relationship and 
the role of liability in furthering the integrity of the securities markets. 
INTRODUCTION 
Twenty-five years ago, at the urging of then-SEC Chairman William 
Cary, the Supreme Court recognized an implied private right of action 
for federal proxy fraud in ]I. Case v. Borak.l Under Cary's direction, the 
SEC advocated a broad remedial interpretation of the federal securities 
laws and an activist role for the courts in implementing the legislation­
an approach that reached frui tion in Borak. More recently the federal 
courts have retreated from the activism espoused by Cary in favor of a 
textualist approach. Decisions such as Central Bank v. First Interstate2 rele­
gate the legacy of William Cary to an almost forgotten era in which the 
federal judiciary was viewed as capable of weighing policy considerations, 
evaluating the recommendations of an expert administrative agency, as­
certaining the regulatory obj ectives of a statutory scheme, and, ultimately, 
utilizing these factors to structure legal rules.3 
There are reasons to question the value of textualism in interpreting 
the federal securities laws, however. In particular, a strict textual reading 
of the securities laws may frustrate the regulatory balance Congress ere-
* Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. I am grateful to Steve The! and my mother 
for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
l. 377 U.S. 426 ( 1964). 
2. 5ll u.s. 164 (1994). 
3. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et a!., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and 
the Federal System 839 (4th ed. 1996) (describing Borak as the "high-water mark of judicial 
implication of remedies"). 
1293 
1294 COLU!v!BIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:1293 
ated by promulgating the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998. More 
broadly, these two statutes suggest a need to revisit Cary's conception of 
the j udicial role in section 1 0 ( b)4 lawmaking. 
In Central Bank, the Court concluded that section 10 ( b) does not 
permit liability to be imposed for aiding and abetting federal securities 
fraud, but it left open the potential scope of primary liability for secon­
dary defendants.5 The Court offered no guidance as to the appropriate 
circumstances for the imposition of primary liability; it merely observed, 
in a somewhat cryptic statement, that secondary defendants, such as ac­
countants, lawyers , and banks, could, under certain circumstances, be 
held liable as primary violators. 6 
Traditionally the federal courts have played a substantial role in 
crafting the scope of liability under the federal securities laws. This tradi­
tion continues as the courts struggle to apply the Supreme Court's deci­
sion in Central Bank in an effort to determine the liability exposure of 
outside professionals7 in private securities fraud litigation under section 
10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19348 ( the Exchange Act) and 
SEC Rule 10b-5.9 Two recent decisions illustrate the problems that courts 
face in interpreting the language of Central Bank. 
In Klein v. Boyd, a panel of the Third Circuit held that a securities 
lawyer who significantly participates in the preparation of client disclo­
sure documents can thereby become an author of the documents . 10 If 
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10 (b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1994). 
5. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 177 (1994). 
6. See id. at 191 ("The absence of§ 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean 
that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from liability under the 
securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs 
a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a 
purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5, 
assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule lOb-5 are met."). 
7. This Article will only address the liability of outside professionals or secondary 
defendants. Cf. Mishkin v. Ageloff, No. 97 Civ. 2690 LAP, 1998 WL 651065 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
23, 1998), slip op. at 17 n.12 (suggesting that the scope of primary liability for secondary 
actors may differ from that applicable to principals). For the purposes of this Article, 
secondary defendants include attorneys, accountants, banks, investment banks, and other 
professionals who render services in connection with securities disclosure. Some courts 
and commentators have sought to distinguish between these professionals in formulating 
liability standards based upon the nature of the services performed. See, e.g., Lewis D. 
Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Liabilities of Lawyers and Accountants Under Rule lOb-5, 
53 Bus. Law. 1157 (1998) (describing developing patterns of liability standards imposed in 
cases involving accountants and those involving lawyers). This Article will not address the 
question of whether courts should develop different standards for different types of 
professionals. 
8. 15 u.s.c. § 78 (b) (1994). 
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998). 
10. [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'l[ 90,136, 90,317 (3d Cir. Feb. 12, 
1998), vacated on grant of rehearing, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4121 (Mar. 9, 1998), at 90,325 
(holding that a defendant's participation in the creation of a fraudulent statement may 
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the documents are fraudulent, the lawyer's conduct may be a sufficient 
basis upon which to impose liability as a primary violator for federal se­
curities fraud. Under this approach, a secondary defendant could incur 
liability for his or her participation in the creation of fraudulent state­
ments issued by someone else.11 
The Second Circuit's approach has been different. In its most recent 
decision to address the issue, Wright v. Emst & Young, l 2 the Second Cir­
cuit employed a narrower standard for liability, 1 3 holding that "a secon­
dary actor cannot incur primary liability under the [Securities Exchange] 
Act for a statement not attributed to that actor at the time of its dissemi­
nation."14 The court rejected the argument that a defendant could be 
liable based upon his or her substantial participation in the creation of 
fraudulent documents, reasoning that any conduct by the defendant 
short of actually making a false and misleading statement was merely aid­
ing and abetting, rather than a basis for primary liability.15 
The disagreement between the Klein court and the Wright court 
stems from differing interpretations of Central Bank. More importantly, 
these decisions share an unduly restrictive interpretive approach-an ef­
fort to determine the scope of liability from the text of section lO(b). 
The appropriate application of Central Bank has been complicated, how­
ever, by subsequent legislative developments: the enactment of two 
amendments to the federal securities laws that reform private civil litiga­
tion. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199516 (the Reform 
Act) dealt with perceived abuses by revising a variety of procedural and 
substantive aspects of private litigation, including explicit modification of 
the liability standards for secondary defendantsP More recently, the Se­
curities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 199818 (the Uniform Stan­
dards Act) preempted state statutory and common law securities fraud 
render him liable as a primary violator even if an investor is unable to attribute the 
statement to the defendant). 
11. The Third Circuit subsequently vacated the panel decision and ordered 
reargument en bane. See Klein v. Boyd, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4121 (Mar. 9, 1998). 
Before the case could be reargued, the parties settled, depriving the Third Circuit of the 
opportunity to resolve the scope of liability for secondary defendants. See Klein v. Boyd, 
Nos. 97-1143 and 97-1261 (Nov. 12, 1998) (order of the Third Circuit Clerk dismissing the 
case with prejudice in accordance with the agreement of the parties). 
12. 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998). 
13. Cf. SEC v. First jersey Securities, 101 F.3d 1450, 1471 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that 
"primary liability may be imposed 'not only on persons who made fraudulent 
misrepresentations but also on those who had knowledge of the fraud and assisted in its 
preparation."' (citation omitted)). 
14. Wright, 152 F.3d at 175. 
15. See id. (distinguishing between the "bright line" test and the "substantial 
participation" test). 
16. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a) et seq. 
(1994 & Supp. I 1995)). 
17. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. 
18. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998). 
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claims by requiring class actions involving nationally traded securities to 
be brought exclusively in federal court under uniform federal stan­
dards.19 Although lower courts struggling with the development of liabil­
ity standards for secondary defendants have sought to reconcile their con­
clusions with Central Bank, they have given little attention to the potential 
impact of these statutes upon the basis for Central Bank's holding. 
The reconciliation effort illustrates a key tension in the interpreta­
tion of section lO(b)-the tension between the application of a Supreme 
Court precedent interpreting a federal statute and subsequent legislation 
that relates to the subject of the decision without directly addressing it. 
Because section lO(b) jurisprudence reflects an ongoing lawmaking dia­
logue between Congress and the federal courts, the current textualist 
methodology of statutory interpretation provides an inadequate tool for 
addressing this tension. The recent politically charged congressional in­
cursions into the field of private securities litigation provide further rea­
son to question the traditional orthodoxy of legislative deference.20 
This Article begins by summarizing, in Part I, the Supreme Court's 
decision in Central Bank and explaining how the lower courts have at­
tempted to apply Central Bank to determine the scope of primary liability 
for outside professionals under section 10 (b). In Part II, the Article iden­
tifies two important legislative developments that postdate Central Bank: 
the adoption of the Reform Act and the Uniform Standards Act. The 
Article then analyzes, in Part III, the methodology of Central Bank, and 
argues that the textualist interpretation espoused by the Court in that 
case is inappropriate. Instead, the Article advocates a broader approach, 
in which courts consider, among other things, the effect of the recent 
statutes and the policy objectives identified by Congress in those statutes. 
In Part IV, the Article applies its suggested approach to the problem of 
delineating the appropriate scope of primary liability. The Article argues 
that the statutes expressly endorse the continued importance of liability 
for outside professionals while, at the same time, instituting reforms ad­
dressed at the litigation abuses perceived by the Central Bank Court. Ac­
cordingly, the Article concludes that recent decisions have been unduly 
restrictive in their reading of section lO(b) liability and advocates more 
fidelity to the statutory purpose. The Article suggests that courts should 
give greater consideration to the nature of the professional's relationship 
19. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption 
of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1998) (describing scope of 
Uniform Standards Act). 
20. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Chasing the Rogue Professional After the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 50 SMU L. Rev. 91, 93 n.6 (1996) (describing 
lobbying efforts for securities litigation reform and observing that the coalition lobbying 
for the legislation "amassed an early $12 million war chest, mostly from the accounting 
profession"); Anthony Q. Fletcher, Note, Curing Crib Death: Emerging Growth 
Companies, Nuisance Suits, and Congressional Proposals for Securities Litigation Reform, 
32 Harv.]. on Legis. 493 n.2 (1995) (describing coalition formed to lobby for litigation 
reform under the name Committee to Eliminate Abusive Securities Suits (CEASE)). 
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with his or her client and the role of liability in enhancing the function­
ing of professionals as gatekeepers and furthering the integrity of the se­
curities markets. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF LIABILITY OF OUTSIDE PROFESSIONALS: THE LEGACY 
OF CENTRAL BANK 
A. The Central Bank Decision 
In Central Bank, the Supreme Court concluded that section 10 (b) 21 
does not permit liability to be imposed upon those who aid and abet fed­
eral securities fraud.22 The decision came with little warning-courts 
and commentators had widely accepted the validity of aiding and abet­
ting liability. 23 The petitioner in Central Bank did not even raise the issue 
until the Court issued a sua sponte order requiring the parties to address 
it.24 Nonetheless, after rejecting the analysis of every lower court to con­
sider the question,25 the Court concluded that, because section lO(b) did 
not contain the terms "aiding and abetting," the scope of the statute did 
not extend beyond primary liability.26 
21. Section 10(b) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules 
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or approptiate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). 
22. See Central Bank v. First Interstate, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994). 
23. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An 
Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 
749, 760 (1995) (explaining that until Central Bank, "no court had suggested any doubt" 
that section lO(b) should be interpreted to impose liability for aiding and abetting 
securities fraud). 
24. See id. See also Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 194-95 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the Court for reaching out to overturn a body of settled law). 
25. See Brief of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Amicus Curiae, in 
Central Bank v. First Interstate, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), available in Lexis, 1992 U.S. Briefs 
854 [hereinafter City Bar Amicus Brief in Central Bank] .  The extensive lower court 
decisions had refined a test for secondary liability that required: 1) the existence of a 
primary violation; 2) scienter by the defendant; and 3) substantial assistance of the 
violation by the defendant. See The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Leading Cases, 108 
Harv. L. Rev. 139, 362 n.3 (1994) (describing scope of aiding and abetting liability at the 
time of the Central Bank decision); see also Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: 
An Equilibrium Analysis, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1055, 1104-05 (1997) (describing legal status of 
aiding and abetting liability as in a stable equilibrium prior to Central Bank) . 
26. 511 U.S. at 191 ("Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and 
abetting, we hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit 
under§ 10(b)."). 
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In reaching this result, the Central Bank Court employed a strict tex­
tualist approach.27 The Court defended its reliance on the statutory text, 
in part, by using a distinction that it had recognized in only one other 
case,28 betvveen statutory interpretation issues involving the scope of con­
duct prohibited by section lO(b) and questions about the elements of the 
liability scheme.29 The Central Bank opinion explained that aiding and 
abetting liability involved a scope of conduct issue and that, accordingly, 
the text of the statute was controlling. 30 Nonetheless, the Court explicitly 
stated that outside professionals could still be liable under section 10  (b) 
as long as the requirements for primary liability were met.31 
The Central Bank decision proceeded to buttress its conclusion with 
arguments about congressional intent and policy considerations.32 Faced 
with congressional silence, the Court refused to infer a broad intention to 
supplement primary liability with aiding and abetting liability, either in 
section lO(b) or generally throughout the Exchange Act.33 The Court 
observed that Congress had made a deliberate choice about the scope of 
secondary liability by explicitly creating liability for controlling persons in 
section 20.34 In addition, the majority opinion noted that Congress had 
enacted the Exchange Act against a regulatory backdrop in which many 
state blue sky laws imposed aiding and abetting liability.35 Finally, the 
opinion rejected arguments that subsequent Congresses had acquiesced 
in or ratified aiding and abetting liability. 36 The Court was unconvinced 
that legislative references to aiding and abetting constituted ratification, 
noting that these references were not the product of the formal legisla­
tive process.37 The decision also concluded that Congress's failure to 
overturn judicial decisions upholding aiding and abetting liability was not 
the equivalent of congressional approvai.38 
The majority opinion similarly rejected policy arguments that aiding 
and abetting liability deters secondary actors from furthering fraudulent 
schemes and increases victim compensation.39 The Court warned that it 
was precluded from using policy considerations as a basis for overriding 
27. See Richard H. Walker & David M. Levine, The Limits of Central Bank's Textualist 
Approach-Attempts to Overdraw the Bank Prove Unsuccessful, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 3 
(1997). 
28. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286 (1993). 
29. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 172-73. 
30. See id. at 177. 
31. See id. at 191. 
32. 2. See id. at 178-90. 
33. See id. at 180-85. 
34. See id. at 184. Section 20 imposes liability on "controlling persons," that is, those 
who "control any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or 
regulation thereunder." 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). 
35. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 184. 
36. See id. at 186. 
37. See id. at 186-87. 
38. See id. at 188-90. 
39. See id. at 185-87. 
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the statutory text.40 Nonetheless, the Court went out of its way to de­
scribe why recognition of aiding and abetting liability was inconsistent 
with the statutory objectives inasmuch as it would "exact[ ] costs that may 
disserve the goals of fair dealing and efficiency in the securities mar­
kets."41 The majority opinion explained that secondary liability is often 
imposed in an unpredictable manner and that, as a result, secondary de­
fendants may suffer undue settlement pressure.42 The opinion also iden­
tified federal securities fraud as presenting a danger of vexatious litiga­
tion.43 The Court viewed this litigation risk as particularly problematic 
for outside professionals because it could cause them to withhold their 
services from new and smaller companies or to pass the costs of litigation 
on to investors.44 
Thus, the task for lower courts after Central Bank has been to define 
the circumstances under which secondary defendants meet the require­
ments for primary liability. Central Bank offers limited guidance in this 
endeavor. The Court's opinion did not address the scope of liability for 
secondary defendants. Moreover, although determining when the con­
duct of outside professionals violates section lO (b) appears to involve a 
scope of conduct question analogous to that in Central Bank, strict textual­
ism is of limited value in ascertaining the scope of liability for secondary 
defendants.45 Section 10(b) is, of course, silent even with respect to the 
imposition of primary liability. If a court nonetheless concludes, as the 
federal courts have done consistently, that the statutory text imposes lia­
bility upon anyone who uses or employs a manipulative or deceptive de­
vice, there are no statutory guidelines as to acceptable defendants. In 
cases in which secondary defendants are acting together with and on be­
half of a client-issuer, and the relevant disclosures are made by and on 
behalf of the client, the text offers no tools for drawing a line between 
those who have committed the fraud and those who should be treated as 
collateral participants. 
40. See id. at 188 ("Policy considerations cannot override our interpretation of the 
text and structure of the Act, except to the extent that they may help to show that 
adherence to the text and structure would lead to a result 'so bizarre' that Congress could 
not have intended it."). 
41. See id. at 184. 
42. See id. 
43. See id. at 189. 
44. See id. 
45. Indeed, the Central Bank decision itself seems to recognize that the analysis 
employed would not be useful in ascertaining the elements of an acknowledged cause of 
action. See Robert A. Prentice, Locating that "Indistinct" and "Virtually Nonexistent" Line 
Between Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. Rev. 691, 712 
(1997) (arguing that neither Central Bank's method of analysis nor its holding is relevant to 
determining the proper parameters of primary liability). 
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B. The Application of Central Bank 
Recent decisions have sought to apply Central Bank's reasoning in an 
effort to develop liability standards for secondary defendants. Cases at 
both ends of the liability spectrum are relatively easy to resolve. Central 
Bank expressly endorses the concept of primary liability for outside pro­
fessionals who make fraudulent statements.46 Thus, when a lawyer or ac­
countant is sued on the basis of his or her own statements rather than 
those of the client, the professional faces primary liability under the stat­
ute.47 Such liability may arise, for example, from misrepresentations con­
tained in an opinion letter.48 Conversely, Central Bank seems to eliminate 
liability based upon pure gatekeeper or whistle blower theories of liability, 
in which an outside professional is sued for his or her inaction in failing 
to prevent a client's fraud.49 At least in circumstances in which the pro­
fessional owes no duty to the victims of the fraud, the failure to act or to 
speak is insufficient for the imposition of primary liability.50 
The cases in between are more troubling. Traditionally, issuers have 
engaged outside professionals to assist in the task of preparing the is­
suer's disclosure documents. This assistance can take the form of advis­
ing the client on disclosure requirements, drafting the necessary docu­
mentation, and verifying that the client's disclosure is accurate and 
complete.51 In evaluating the potential liability of outside professionals 
based upon this role, one possible approach is to adopt a bright line rule 
that the client alone is responsible for the contents of its disclosure docu­
ments. 52 A few courts, such as those in the Second Circuit, have followed 
this approach, reasoning that for Central Bank to have any meaning a de-
46. See supra note 6. 
47. See, e.g., McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 F.3d 390, 397 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(concluding that accounting firm could be liable for its fraudulent audit report, which was 
included in client's Form 10-K and filed with the SEC). Although pre-Central Bank cases 
often termed this secondary liability, Central Bank makes it clear that this characterization 
was incorrect. See Prentice, supra note 45, at 707 (explaining that liability for one's own 
misrepresentations is primary, not secondary). 
48. See, e.g., Kline v. First Western Gov't Sec., 24 F.3d 480, 486-87 (3d Cir. (1994). 
49. See Prentice, supra note 45, at 765-66 (explaining why the Central Bank decision 
should eliminate whistle blower liability). 
50. The decision in SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 
(D.D.C. 1978), is one of the better known examples of a situation in which attorneys were 
held responsible for their failure to take action to stop a transaction once they learned of 
the use of false financial data. The court did not rely upon the existence of any duty to the 
victims as a basis for imposing liability. See id. at 713. 
51. See, e.g., Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Primary Liability of Securities Lawyers, 
50 SMU L. Rev. 383, 387-90 (1996) (describing the role of the securities lawyer in assisting 
a client with the disclosure process). 
· 
52. See, e.g., Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226-27 (lOth Cir. 
1996) (adopting this approach, although describing it as "far from a bright line [rule]"); 
see also Patricia Bianchini, Note, The Statement Someone Else Makes May be Your Own: 
Primary Liability Under Section 10(b) After Central Bank, 71 St.John's L. Rev. 767, 786-87 
(1997) (criticizing this approach as inconsistent with Central Bank and the intent of 
Congress). 
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fendant must actually make a false and misleading statement rather than 
aid someone else.53 This approach is supported both by the text of the 
statute and by the concern articulated in Central Bank that the application 
of liability standards be sufficiently predictable. 54 
Other courts, particularly those in the Ninth Circuit, have rejected 
the bright line rule in favor of the conclusion that liability can be im­
posed upon outside professionals who substantially participate in the dis­
closure process, even if the documents prepared do not purport to be 
statements by the professionai.55 The Third Circuit panel in Klein v. Boyd 
justified this result by explaining that sufficient assistance makes the pro­
fessional a co-author of the documents, thereby rendering the profes­
sional accountable for misrepresentations or omissions in those docu­
ments.56 Similarly, courts have reasoned that primary liability may 
extend to all members of the "drafting group."57 The SEC has advocated 
primary liability for an outside professional who "acting alone or with 
others, creates a misrepresentation."58 Under this theory, the secondary 
53. See Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997). Even under the Second 
Circuit approach, a primary violator need not communicate directly with investors. 
Rather, liability is appropriate whenever a defendant is the source of a fraudulent 
misrepresentation and knows or should know that the misrepresentation will be 
communicated to investors. See, e.g., In re Kidder Peabody Securities Litig., 10 F. Supp. 
2d 398, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Related to this is the conclusion that an outside professional 
may be primarily liable for fraud committed through his or her direct contacts with 
investors. See, e.g., Rubin v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that attorney and his law firm could be primarily liable based on "direct contacts" 
with the plaintiffs). See also Mishkin v. Ageloff, 1998 WL 651065 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1998), 
slip op. at 18 (finding allegations that defendant participated in a fraudulent scheme or 
committed a fraudulent act sufficient to state a claim for primary liability where defendant 
was a principal actor rather than an outside professional). 
54. See Shapiro, 123 F.3d at 720 (defending this approach as providing more 
guidance to outside professionals than a rule allowing liability to attach to those who 
provide substantial or significant assistance to the representations of others); accord 
Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1226. 
55. See, e.g., In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 38 F.3d 1078, 1090 n.3 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (finding accounting firm's significant participation in drafting misleading 
letters to the SEC sufficient to support a claim of primary liability); Cashman v. Coopers & 
Lybrand, 877 F. Supp. 425, 433 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that primary liability could be 
based upon accountant's central role in the drafting and formation of misrepresentations); 
In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that liability 
can be based upon an accounting firm's intricate involvement in creating false 
documents). 
56. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) � 90,136, 90,325. 
57. See In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 629 (9th Cir. 1994); see 
also Murphy v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rev. (CCH) � 99,241, 99,347 
(D. Or. 1996) (upholding as sufficient allegations that underwriters were "'direct 
participants'" in the alleged wrongdoing by their role in coordinating the offering, 
drafting disputed offering documents and conducting a due diligence investigation"). 
58. Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae 14, in Klein v. 
Boyd, Nos. 97-1143, 97-1261 (3d Cir. 1997) (visited Apr. 1, 1999) <http:/ I 
www.sec.govnews/legal/klein.txt> [hereinafter SEC Amicus Brief in Klein] (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) . 
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defendant need not sign or certify the disclosure documents .59 Indeed, 
the secondary defendant's role or identity need not even be known to 
potential investors; his or her participation is sufficient.60 
Although courts have claimed that this approach is consistent with 
Central Bank because it only imposes liability upon those who make mis­
representations (as opposed to those who provide substantial assistance) ,  
premising liability upon a professional ' s  participation in a collective pro­
cess appears perilously close to the liability standard rej ected by Central 
Bank.61 Moreover, even if one accepts the premise that an outside profes­
sional 's  participation in the preparation of fraudulent client disclosure 
should result in liability under appropriate circumstances, the difficulties 
in applying this approach raise additional concerns. Using this approach, 
courts have premised liability upon the degree of the professional 's  par­
ticipation, explaining that the professional 's  involvement m ust be "sub­
stantial" or "significant." It is virtually impossible, however, to translate 
these terms into an articulable legal standard by which to quantify the 
level of participation necessary for the imposition of liability. This creates 
several problems. 
First, imposing liability upon outside professionals based upon their 
level of participation is unpredictable and subj ect to an ad hoc fact-based 
evaluation.62 The Central Bank Court expressly identified an unpredict­
able standard of liability for outside professionals as undesirable. 53 Sec­
ond, the imposition of liability based upon a professional ' s  degree of in­
volvement may have the practical effect of punishing him or her for 
professionally responsible behavior.64 The purpose of engaging securi­
ties professionals is to obtain their assistance in the preparation of the 
required disclosure documents, yet, a professional who diligently assists 
the client in preparing these documents is thereby subj ected to liability 
59. See, e.g., Carley Capital Group. v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 1 90,341, 91,635 (D. Ga. 1998) (accepting the standard of liability advocated by the 
SEC and concluding that this standard is "consistent with the 'directly or indirectly' 
language in Section 10 (b)"). 
60. See SEC Amicus Brief in Klein, supra note 58, at 8-13 (arguing that a rule 
imposing liability only upon defendants who are identified to investors is inconsistent with 
Central Bank). 
61. See Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Allegations of 'assisting,' 
'participating in,' 'complicity in' and similar synonyms . . .  all fall within the prohibitive 
bar of Central Bank."). 
62. The scienter requirement provides insufficient protection against liability due, in 
part, to its fact-based nature. In addition to the evidentiary problems posed by a 
professional's scienter defense, its imposition requires the defendant to go to trial, thereby 
incurring substantial litigation costs. These costs are the source of the settlement pressure 
identified by the Court in Central Bank. 
63. See Central Bank v. First Interstate, 511 U.S. 164, 188 (1994). 
64. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 
13, in Klein v. Boyd, Nos. 97-1143, 97-1261 (3d Cir. 1997) (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (warning that "it may not be possible for attorneys to satisfy professional standards 
of competence without being substantially involved in the drafting process") [hereinafter 
City Bar Amicus Brief in Klein]. 
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precisely because he or she has provided meaningful assistance. Third, 
the standard encourages securities professionals to distance themselves 
from their client's product by refusing to draft, review, or verify client 
statements. This result sacrifices both the client's interests and those of 
outside investors who benefit from the involvement of outside profession­
als in the preparation process.65 
The existing lower court decisions are currently in conflict both as to 
the legal standard they articulate and the application of that standard. 
However, if the courts were to adopt a rule that imposes liability based 
upon some level of participation in the preparation of client disclosure, 
the result may be substantially to limit the practical effect of Central Bank 
and to apply, in essence, the pre- Central Bank liability standards under the 
new name of primary liability. 66 Apart from the question of whether this 
approach conflicts with Central Bank's reading of the statutory text, it 
raises concern over the policy considerations identified by the Court in 
Central Bank. These policy issues-the lack of predictability, the settle­
ment pressure imposed by fact-based liability standards, and the risk of 
vexatious litigation-would persist under a substantial participation liabil­
ity standard. 67 
II. RECENT FEDERAL SECURITIES LEGISLATION 
In attempting to formulate a test for when outside professionals 
should be held liable for federal securities fraud, it is necessary to expand 
the analysis beyond Central Bank. Subsequent to Central Bank, Congress 
adopted two significant amendments to the federal securities laws that 
specifically address private civil litigation. With respect to all three factors 
identified by the Central Bank decision-statutory text, legislative intent, 
and policy considerations-the amendments offer additional insight 
about the appropriate scope of liability for secondary defendants. 
The statutes directly addressed the perceptions of abusive and vexa­
tious litigation that animated the Central Bank decision. In 1995, Con-
65. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 51, at 396 (arguing that investors rely upon the 
lawyer's work in making investment decisions). 
66. See Donald C. Langevoort, Words from on High About Rule lOb-5: Chiarella's 
History, Central Bank's Future, 20 DeL J Corp. L. 865, 869 (1995) (predicting that Central 
Bank decision would be a good candidate for lower court revisionism which could have the 
effect of substantially reducing the extent to which the decision changes the status quo). 
67. Although few courts have experimented with other approaches, there are 
alternatives to both the bright line approach articulated in Wright and imposing liability 
based upon a sufficient degree of participation. It is possible, for example, to analogize to 
the Supreme Court's analysis in Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988). In Pinter, the Court 
rejected the idea that primary liability as a seller under section 12 of the Securities Act of 
1933 was limited to the owner of a security. Instead, the Court extended primary liability 
to include those who solicit the purchase of securities if they are motivated, at least in part, 
by a desire to serve their own financial interests or those of the issuer. See id. at 642-47. A 
court could similarly predicate primary liability under section IO(b) on the defendant's 
financial interest, as well as participation, in the fraudulent transaction. 
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gress overrode President Clinton's veto and adopted the Private Securi­
ties Litigation Reform Act.68 The Reform Act contained a variety of 
procedural and substantive reforms designed to reduce the volume of 
private securities fraud litigation and to curb litigation abuse. These re­
forms included a heightened pleading standard, a safe harbor for for­
ward-looking statements ,  and the creation of a lead plaintiff to monitor 
li tigation decisionmaking. 69 
The Reform Act directly addressed liability of secondary defendants 
in several ways. First, section 201 of the Reform Act7° replaced j oint and 
several liability with a "fair share" system of proportionate liability for de­
fendants who do not have actual knowledge of a fraud.71  Second, the 
Reform Act restored to the SEC the authority to proceed against those 
who aid and abet securities fraud.72 Significantly, however, Congress re­
j ected efforts to provide a private right of action against aiders and abet­
tors.73 Third, through the adoption of section lOA, the Reform Act 
broadened the duties of independent auditors by explicitly setting forth 
statutory requirements for an audit of issuer financial statements and by 
requiring that auditors who detect material illegal acts take specified re­
medial action.74 
68. Reform Act, supra note 16. 
69. See Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 Ariz. 
L. Rev. 533, 534-37 (1997) (describing history of the Reform Act and concerns to which it 
was addressed); Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 
717 (1996) (describing provisions of the Reform Act). 
70. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 758-59 (1995) (amending section 21D of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
71. The Conference Report describes this provision as addressing " [o]ne of the most 
manifestly unfair aspects of the current system of securities litigation." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 736. See also 
Melissa Harrison, The Assault on the Liability of Outside Professionals: Are Lawyers and 
Accountants Off the Hook?, 65 U. Cin. L. Rev. 473, 518-21 (1997) (describing 
proportionate liability provision). The proportionate liability provision contains two 
exceptions: 1) secondary defendants are jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs who prove 
damages exceeding ten percent of their net worth and whose net worth is less than 
$200,000; and 2) secondary defendants are liable for an additional payment of up to fifty 
percent if another defendant is insolvent and unable to pay its respective share of damages. 
See id. at 518-19. 
72. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(f) (West 1997). 
73. For example, Senator Bryan introduced Amendment 1474, which was designed to 
overrule Central Bank and to provide for a private right of action against aiders and 
abettors. See 141 Cong. Rec. S9109-9116 (daily ed.June 27, 1995). The Amendment was 
rejected by Congress. See Broady R. Hodder, Note, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank and 
Its Aftermath: Securities Professionals' Ever-Changing Liabilities, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 343, 
357-58 (1997) (describing defeated efforts in Congress to restore aiding and abetting 
liability). 
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(a)-(b) (Supp. I 1995). The SEC subsequently adopted rules to 
implement§ lOA. See Implementation of Section lOA of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, SEC Release No. 34-38387, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,743 (1997). See also Marc I. Steinberg, 
Securities Law After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act-Unfinished Business, 50 
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Subsequent to the adoption of the Reform Act, Congress heard com­
plaints that some of the Reform Act's  effectiveness was being undercut by 
state court litigation.75 Although the extent of the problem was seriously 
disputed,76 Congress responded by passing the Securities Litigation Uni­
form Standards Act of 1998,  which President Clinton signed in October 
of 1 998.77 The Uniform Standards Act adopted a uniform federal stan­
dard for class action litigation involving fraud in connection with transac­
tions in nationally traded securities.78 The effect of the statute was to 
preempt state law causes of action for fraud, retaining, with certain ex­
ceptions, federal liability as the exclusive remedy for investors. 79 Thus, 
the Uniform Standards Act eliminated the ability of plaintiffs to avoid the 
limitations of the Central Bank decision by proceeding against secondary 
defendants under state law.80 
III.  QuEsTIONs OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION-THE CoNTINUED 
SIGNIFICANCE OF CENTRAL BANK 
Courts and commentators have devoted little analysis to whether the 
adoption of the Reform Act and the Uniform Standards Act should influ­
ence the continued significance of Central Bank. In part, this question 
depends upon understanding the rationale for the Central Bank decision. 
The Central Bank opinion claims to place primary reliance on a narrow 
interpretation of the text of section l O (b ) . This textualism is consistent 
with current Supreme Court j urisprudence.81  Regardless of the general 
appropriateness of textualism as a method of statutory interpretation,82 it  
SMU L.  Rev. 9, 1 2-13  ( 1 996) (describing new audit, notification and reporting 
requirements imposed on auditors). 
75. See, e.g., Richard H. Walker, Evaluating the Preemption Evidence: Have the 
Proponents Met Their Burden?, 60 Law & Contemp. Prob. 237 ( 1 997) (describing and 
evaluating arguments that effectiveness of certain Reform Act provisions was reduced by 
migration of litigation to state court). 
76. See id. at 248-49. 
77. Pub. L. No. 1 05-353, 1 1 2  Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
78. See Statement by the President, U.S. Newswire, Nov. 3, 1 998, available in 1 998 WL 
1 3607107 (describing effect of legislation as providing "uniform national standards" for 
class actions). 
79. See generally Painter, supra note 1 9  (describing effect of the Uniform Standards 
Act). 
80. See, e.g., Branson, supra note 20, at 1 1 6-20 (describing ways in which state law 
offers broader recourse against collateral defendants than federal securities law after the 
Reform Act and Central Bank) .  
8 1 .  See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 23, at 750 ( 1 995) (describing Court's increasing 
reliance on textualism during period from 1982 to 1 992 and reduced use of legislative 
purpose and history); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. 
Rev. 621 , 624 ( 1 990) (describing Justice Scalia's "new textualism" as "the most interesting 
development in the Court's legisprudence (the jurisprudence of legislation) in the 
1 980s"). 
82. Cf. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 13 ( 1 995) (arguing 
that strict textualism is both intellectually incoherent and illegitimate because it renders 
the judiciary unfaithful to the legislature). 
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is not clear that its heavy emphasis on the statutory text is  an appropriate 
methodology for interpreting the federal securities laws.83 
A. The Role of Textualism in Interpreting Federal Securities Law 
There are several reasons to be wary of textualism in the secunt1es 
area.84 First, the federal securities laws contain a number of provisions in 
which the statutory text is limited and the legislative history sparse.85 
This structure is partially due to the age of the legislation-modem stat­
utes frequently contain highly detailed enumeration of permitted claims, 
authorized claimants, available remedies, and so forth. The evolution to­
ward greater statutory detail has been influenced by Suprem e  Court deci­
sions that impose affi rmative drafting obligations upon Congress.86 Yet, 
the federal securities laws were passed in an era that predates those obli­
gations.87 As a consequence, decisions such as ]I. Case v. Borak,88 which 
recognize a private right of action under a statute that does not explicitly 
provide one, reflect a common law approach to statutory i nterpretation 
that is curren tly disfavored.89 
83. The Supreme Court has vacillated in its use of textualism to interpret the federal 
securities laws. Compare Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985) 
(textualist approach requires Court to reject sale of a business doctrine in determining 
whether stock is within the statutory definition of a security) with Reves v. Emst & Young, 
494 U.S. 56, 62 (1990) (declining to rely exclusively on statutory text to determine when a 
note is a security). 
84. In addition to the criticisms detailed here, commentators have argued that 
textualism is ill-suited for securities jurisprudence because of the difficulty in identifying 
the relevant statutory text. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 82, at 22. 
85. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, We Must Never Forget that It Is an Inkblot We Are 
Expounding: Section 10(b) as a Rorschach Test, 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 41, 43 (1995) 
(describing the federal securities laws, and section lO(b) in particular, as an "inkblot"). 
86. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994) (refusing to 
apply statute retroactively unless Congress so instructs); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 
(1990) (requiring express direction by Congress to override presumption of concurrent 
state and federal jurisdiction over federal claims); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 
473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) (requiring "unequivocal expression of congressional intent" to 
exercise its power under the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity). 
87. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698-99 (1979) (recognizing 
that analysis of whether Congress intended to create a private right of action must consider 
contemporary legal context, and that for statutes passed during an era in which courts 
consistently found implied remedies, it is appropriate to presume that Congress expected 
the statutes to be interpreted in conformity with that approach); see also Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 381 (1982) (implying a private right 
of action under the Commodity Exchange Act on the theory that such a remedy was 
intended by the Congress that enacted the statute as a result of the contemporary legal 
context); Eisenberg, supra note 82, at 38 (arguing that strict textualism should not be 
applied to statutes that were drafted when it was not the official methodology for statutory 
interpretation). 
88. 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (recognizing an implied private right of action under section 
14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 578 n (a) (1998)). 
89. Indeed, at least one commentator has noted the irony in the Central Bank 
decision's reliance on textualism to reject aiding and abetting liability and, "in the same 
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Second, the statutory structure of federal securities regulation,  par­
ticularly the Sec uri ties Exchange Act of 1 934, has led Congress to give 
little attention to weighing the policy issues inherent in securities regula­
tion and itself tailoring an enforcement mechanism to address particular­
ized policy obj ectives .  In part, this has resulted from Congress delegating 
substantial rulemaking and enforcement power90 to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.91 In retrospect, this delegation seems appropri­
ate-the SEC may be better able to respond in a rapid and nuanced man­
ner to the technical and frequently changing securities industry with the 
tools of an administrative agency than could Congress through refine­
ments to the statutory text.92 In exercising its delegated authority, the 
SEC has relied heavily upon a joint public and private system of enforce­
ment, in which private civil litigation supplements government enforce­
ment efforts.93 The SEC's effort to strike a balance and to maintain ap­
propriate levels of enforcement accordingly bears a limited connection to 
the statutory text. 
Third, the unstructured nature of the federal securities laws has also 
led to greater judicial activism. Congress deliberately drafted the securi­
ties laws broadly to enable the regulatory scheme to address n ew develop­
ments in the industry including the development of new methods of 
fraud.94 The federal courts responded to this challenge by interpreting 
the statutes in a manner that furthers Congress's remedial objectives .  
The implication of a private right of action under provisions such as  sec­
tions 1 4 ( a) and 10(b) is an example of this approach; the Court's motiva­
tion in Borak was to allow p rivate litigation to supplement public enforce­
ment.95 As a result, whole areas of securities regulation have little or no 
origin in the text of the statute, but rather are the creations of federal 
breath," recognizing an implied private right of action against primary violators. Ediberto 
Roman, Statutory Interpretation in Securities Jurisprudence: A Failure of Textualism, 75 
Neb. L. Rev. 377, 407 (1996). 
90. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1050 
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (describing broad congressional grant of rulemaking authority to the SEC 
and citing various statutory examples); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(explaining broad enforcement power of SEC). 
91. Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission in section 4 of the 
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78d. 
92. See Amy E. Fahey, Note, United States v. O 'Hagan: The Supreme Court Abandons 
Textualism to Adopt the Misappropriation Theory, 25 Fordham Urb. LJ. 507, 533 (1998). 
93. See Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings on 
the Impact of the Supreme Court's Decision in Central Bank Before the Subcommittee on 
Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 
2d Sess. (1994), available in 1994 WL 233142, at *10-11 (statement of Arthur Levitt, 
Chairman, SEC) (testifying that SEC cannot pursue every violation of federal securities 
laws and that private actions serve as a necessary complement to SEC enforcement 
actions). 
94. See Walker & Levine, supra note 27, at 4-5 (arguing that, because Congress 
intentionally drafted the federal securities broadly, strict textualism is poorly suited to 
interpreting them). 
95. See Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 Va. L. Rev. 553, 557 (1981). 
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common law.96 Private civil liability under section l O (b)  and insider trad­
ing liabili ty are two prominent examplesY7 Given the extent to which 
judicial lawmaking has occupied the field of securities regulation,  con­
gressional fine-tuning is virtually impossible unless Congress accepts the 
legal framework created by the courts.98 In fact, Congress appears to 
have done so; in adopting subsequent amendments to the federal securi­
ties laws, Congress has repeatedly expressed its approval of the courts ' 
decisions in these areas.99 
These concerns, and others, support the Supreme Court's earlier ap­
proach to interpreting the federal securities laws-an approach consis­
tent with the recognition of an implied private right of action for federal 
securities fraud. The Court's  original approach-whether described as 
purposivist, intentionalist or structuralist-was characterized by the 
Court's willingness to inform its interpretation by policy arguments as 
well as text and legislative history. 10° 
Central Bank has been widely cited as demonstrating the current 
Court's commitment to strict textualisrn and rej ection of interpretive 
principles that incorporate policy arguments. Recent Supreme Court de­
cisions, however, suggest that the Central Bank decision may be m ore of 
an aberration than it initially appeared. In Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. , for 
example, which was decided only a year after Central Bank, the m aj ority 
opinion purported to use a textualist analysis, yet rej ected the explicit 
statutory definition of a prospectus as inconsistent with legislative in­
tent. 1 0 1  As the dissenters in Gustafson pointed out, although it claims to 
apply textualism, the majority's opinion can only be explained on policy 
grounds. 102 Indeed, commentators have criticized the Court's tortured 
effort to manipulate the statutory text as a threat to the very coherence of 
96. See Steven The!, Section 1 2 (2) of the Securities Act: Does Old Legislation 
Matter?, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1 1 83, 1 198 ( 1 995) (arguing that recent securities legislation 
"can fairly be read" as congressional delegation of broad law-making authority to courts) .  
97. See Steve The!, Statutory Findings and Insider Trading Regulation, 50 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1 09 1 ,  1 1 34 ( 1997) ("The judge-made law of rule lOb-5 has already largely supplanted 
enacted statutes as the primary vehicle of securities regulation."). 
98. See id. 
99. See The!, supra note 96, at 1 200 ("In the Sanctions Act, the Enforcement Act and 
the limitations legislation, Congress has acknowledged that the courts make the law of 
private liability for securities fraud and established a regime that contemplates the courts' 
continuing to do so.") . 
1 00. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 323-33 ( 1 994) 
(describing different methodologies of statutory interpretation employed by the Court) . 
1 0 1 .  5 1 3  U.S. 561 , 581-82 ( 1 995) (reasoning from legislative history that Congress 
did not intend to extend liability under section 1 2 (2) to every private or secondary sale of 
securities, despite statutory language suggesting such a result) .  
102.  See id. a t  594 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The majority's analysis of § 1 2 (2) is 
motivated by its policy preferences.") ; id. at 596 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
majority for statutory construction supported by "impressive policy reasons" but 
inconsistent with "statute's defining text") ; see also id. at 590-01 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing majority opinion's methodology as inconsistent with the approach taken in 
Central Bank) . 
I 
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the statutory structure . 1 03 Nonetheless, even critics of the Court's m eth­
odology concede that, from a policy perspective, the decision reached the 
correct result. 104 Accordingly, despite the obvious differences between 
section 12 (2 ) , the statutory provision at issue in Gustafson, and section 
10 (b) , the decision may signal the Court's willingness to abandon a textu­
alist result that is inconsistent with the logic of the regulatory structure or 
industry practice . 1 05 
Subsequently, the Court more candidly rej ected strict textualism in 
analyzing the application of section 1 0 (b) to insider trading. In United 
States v. O 'Hagan, 1 06 the Supreme Court refused to use either the m eth­
odology of Central Bank or the language of section 10 (b)  as a basis for 
rej ecting the misappropriation theory. 1 07 D espite the seeming suitability 
of Central Bank to the question of whether misappropriation is within the 
scope of conduct regulated by section 10 (b) , the Court did not use the 
scope of conduct test in its analysis. In addition, and more importantly, 
the O 'Hagan Court distinguished the Central Bank decision on the 
grounds that it was addressed to private l itigation 1 08 and m otivated by 
policy considerations . 1 09 Thus, O 'Hagan suggests that the Court may be 
reconsidering the validity of strict textualism within the context of securi­
ties jurisprudence. 1 1 0 
103. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Leading Cases, 1 09 Harv. L. Rev. 
1 1 1 ,  336-39 ( 1 995). 
104. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 1 2 (2)  Mter the Gustafson 
Debacle, 50 Bus. Law. 1 23 1 ,  1 270 ( 1 995 ) ;  The Supreme Court, 1 994 Term-Leading 
Cases, supra note 1 03, at 338-39 (acknowledging that "majority's ultimate holding . . .  is 
widely perceived to be beneficial for policy reasons"). 
1 05. See, e.g., Therese Maynard, A Requiem: Reflections on Gustafson, 57 Ohio St. 
L.J. 1 327 ( 1 996) (describing and criticizing the Gustafson Court's disregard for the 
statutory language and structure); Brian E. Burns, Comment, Red Means Green: The 
Disruption of the Statutory Construction Process in Gustafson to Harmonize Section 1 2 (2) 
and Rule 1 0b-5 Private Liability Actions Under the Federal Securities Laws, 57 Ohio St. LJ. 
1 365, 1 389 ( 1 996) (describing Gustafson as "a structural approach, 'dynamic' approach, or 
some unconventional variation of a conventional textual approach" and as "a drastic 
departure from the Court's consistently literal plain meaning approach in construing the 
federal securities laws"). 
106. 521  U.S. 642 ( 1 997). 
107. See, e.g., Walker & Levine, supra note 27, at 5 (describing O 'Hagan decision as a 
retreat from the textual analysis of Central Bank) ; Fahey, supra note 92, at 530 (arguing that 
O 'Hagan decision was based on purposivism, not textualism). 
108. See O 'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 664 (" Central Bank's  discussion concerned only private 
civil litigation under § 1 0 (b) and Rule 1 0b-5, not criminal liability."). The O'Hagan 
decision's quote from page 173 of the Central Bank decision is telling: "We have refused to 
allow [private] 10b-5 challenges to conduct not prohibited by the text of the statute." Id. 
at 651. The O 'Hagan Court inserts the word "private." 
109. Id. 
1 1 0. See, e.g., Walker & Levine, supra note 27, at 21. Walker and Levine argue that 
O'Hagan confirms that Central Bank has not ushered in the revolution in the 
interpretation of the securities laws that some have proclaimed. The mere fact 
that a specific fraudulent practice, such as insider trading, is not literally 
prohibited by the text of section lO(b) does not mean, under Central Bank, that 
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B .  Legislative Ratification or Acquiescence 
Even if the lower courts reject a strong textualist approach, they may 
nonetheless be reluctant to rely heavily on the recent legislation in inter­
preting the scope of outside professional liability. The Supreme Court 
has repeatedly refused to consider subsequent legislative developments in 
interpreting the scope of a statute. l11 Indeed, in Central Bank, the Court 
explicitly rejected the argument that Congress's adoption of several 
amendments to the federal securities laws after courts widely interpreted 
section 10 (b) to provide a cause of action for aiding and abetting securi­
ties fraud was evidence that Congress acquiesced m these 
interpretations.1 1 2  
Commentators typically proffer two bases upon which to consider 
subsequent legislation: ratification and acquiescence. Ratification re­
quires affirmative action by Congress. This action can arguably range 
from Congress reenacting the statute in question and explicitly adopting 
the courts' interpretation, to Congress adopting a subsequent statute that 
builds upon the structure established by the interpretation, to a congres­
sional vote that defeats a proposed amendment to overturn the interpre­
tation.113 The strongest argument in favor of ratification characterizes 
Congress's action as an adoption of the courts' interpretation of the stat­
ute and an incorporation of that interpretation into law. The counter­
argument is that, for this adoption to have the effect of lawmaking, it can 
only be achieved through the formal legislative process. 
It is more difficult to justify reliance on congressional acquiescence 
as a basis for referencing subsequent legislation because it is, in effect, 
reliance on congressional silence or inaction. The argument is that when 
Congress amends a statute that has been previously interpreted by the 
courts without revising the statute to modify the courts' interpretation, 
the amendment constitutes implicit approval of those aspects of the inter­
pretation that have not been changed. As the Court and commentators 
have observed, the vagaries of the legislative process make it difficult to 
ascertain the causes of congressional inaction. This makes it hazardous 
to use inaction as an indication of congressional intent. 1 1 4 
I d. 
the practice does not violate section 1 0 (b) 's broad prohibition against 
manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances. 
1 1 1 .  See, e.g., Pub. Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 1 58, 1 68 
( 1 989) ("We have observed on more than one occasion that the interpretation given by 
one Congress (or a committee or Member thereof) to an earlier statute is of little 
assistance in discerning the meaning of that statute."). 
1 1 2.  See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 
1 1 3. See, e.g., Donald R. Livingston & Samuel A. Marcosson, The Court at the 
Crossroads: Runyon, Section 1981 and the Meaning of Precedent, 37 Emory LJ. 949, 970 
( 1 988). 
1 14. "Congress's failure to overturn a statutory precedent is [not] reason for this 
Court to adhere to it. It is ' impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that 
congressional failure to act represents' affirmative congressional approval of the Court's 
I 
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There is  a difference, however, between using congressional ratifica­
tion or acquiescence as a basis for adhering to a prior j udicial interpre ta­
tion of a statute and looking to subsequent legislation for interpretive 
guidance. 1 1 5  This is particularly true when, as in the present case, the 
subsequent legislation both provides affirmative evidence of the congres­
sional obj ectives behind the regulatory scheme and reconfigures that 
scheme in light of problems that had previously been identified by the 
Court. It is possible to argue-as the Court does, particularly when it 
employs strict textualism-that the intent of the current Congress is irrel­
evant to the question of how to interpret a statute passed a number of 
years ago. l 1 6 Still, the separation of powers principles that support textu­
alism also counsel deference to the legislature to resolve policy issues. 
Accordingly, when a Court is engaged in policy analysis, it seems appro­
priate to consider the articulated position of Congress on the policy ques­
tion involved. 
Additionally, this approach provides a basis for employing the princi­
ples behind dynamic statutory interpretation, 1 1 7  yet it grounds those prin­
ciples within the constitutional structure. The Court may find it appro­
priate to consider recent developments in interpreting a statute, but be 
concerned about charges of activism if it relies upon its j udgment to 
make policy choices. Reference to subsequent congressional intent with 
regard to the relevant policy issues allows the Court to combine legislative 
deference with a realistic approach to the issues at hand. In an area such 
as securities regulation, where Congress has broadly delegated lawmaking 
authority to the courts, j udicial consideration of recent legislation recon­
figures the lawmaking process as more of a partnership. 
IV. FuTuRE DIRECTION oN LIABILITY STANDARDs-A TRAVEL ADvrsoRY 
FOR THE FEDERAL CouRTS 
As indicated above, reliance on the methodology of strict textualism 
offers little guidance for lower courts in articulating a standard of primary 
liability for secondary defendants. If, however, decisions such as O 'Hagan 
can properly be read as modifying the Central Bank approach, lower 
statutory interpretation." Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2371 n. 1 
(1989) (quoting johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671-72 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). See also John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for 
Legislative Intent: A Venture Into "Speculative Unrealities," 64 B.U. L. Rev. 737, 746-48 
( 1 985) (explaining why it is inappropriate to rely on congressional silence or inaction as 
probative of congressional intent). 
1 15. Cf. The!, supra note 97, at 1 093-94 (arguing that Court's analysis of the 
misappropriation theory of insider trading should be influenced by statutory "findings" 
contained in the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988). 
1 1 6. Cf. id. at 1 1 22 (evaluating power of Congress to decide in 1 988 what it intended 
in an earlier statute). 
1 17. See generally Eskridge, supra note 1 00 (advocating a methodology in which 
statutes are interpreted in light of post-enactment developments and cunent societal 
context). 
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courts should be looking beyond the statutory text to answer the ques­
tion. This Article advocates that courts look to the Reform Act and the 
Uniform Standards Act for clarification of congressional intent. Courts 
should then formulate a liability standard consistent with the congres­
sional purpose behind imposing liability on securities professionals and 
the policy considerations relevant to that objective. 
O 'Hagan explicitly affirms the relevance of the purposes of a statute 
to its interpretation . In accepting the misappropriation theory, the Court 
explained, "The theory is also well-tuned to an animating purpose of the 
Exchange Act: to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote 
investor confidence ." 1 18  Similarly, the Court indicated in Virginia Bank­
shares, Inc. v. Sandberg that "where a legal structure of private statutory 
rights has developed without clear indications of congressional intent, 
the contours of that structure need not be frozen . . . . " and that, in such a 
case, it is appropriate to look to policy reasons for deciding where the 
"outer limits" of the cause of action should lie . 1 19 In light of O 'Hagan's 
characterization of Central Bank as predicated upon policy considerations, 
subsequent courts should use these policy considerations to inform their 
interpretation of Central Bank, and hence the scope of primary liability. 
The policy issue that concerned the Central Bank Court was the risk 
of abusive litigation . 1 20 The Court found that section I O (b) presented a 
particular risk of excessive and vexatious litigation, and the Court identi­
fied a specific problem in the imposition of 1 0 (b)  liability upon secon­
dary actors. 1 2 1  Outside professionals, the Court feared, were required to 
expend large sums in defense even in cases in which their involvement in 
the transaction was minima1 . 1 22 Moreover, the Court warned that the liti­
gation costs incurred by these outside professionals could be passed on to 
clients .l 23 
These observations are clearly relevant in formulating a liability stan­
dard for secondary defendants .  Yet, the litigation structure that led to 
the concerns identified in Central Bank has been significantly altered by 
subsequent legislative reform. At first blush, the tenor of the subsequent 
legislation seems to support the argument that the scope of liability for 
secondary defendants should be drawn narrowly. As the Central Bank 
Court observed, an expansive liability standard would subj ect outside pro­
fessionals to more extensive litigation. 124 The Court viewed this exposure 
as undesirable . 1 25 Both the Reform Act and the Uniform Standards Act 
indicate a similar congressional mindset; the statutes demonstrate the de-
118. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997). 
119. 501 U.S. 1083, 1104-05 (1991). 
120. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate, 511 U.S. 164, 189 (1994). 
121. See id. 
122. See id. 
123. See id. 
124. See id. 
125. See id. 
l 1 ; 
I 
j 
< 
l 
l 
I 
l 
j 
j 
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sire to reduce the scope of private securities fraud litigation generally and 
the exposure of collateral defendants in particular. Additionally, Con­
gress seems to have concurred in the Central Bank result by its explicit 
refusal to reverse the Central Bank decision and thereby reinstate aiding 
and abetting liability in private litigation. 
Upon further analysis, however, the significance of the subsequent 
legislation appears more ambiguous. Although Congress refused to re­
store aiding and abetting liability, it clearly anticipated the continued lia­
bility of secondary defendants when it adopted the Reform Act provision 
establishing proportionate liability. Proportionate liability rules are of 
limited importance unless the general standard of liability holds collat­
eral defendants responsible for securities fraud. 126 Moreover, the Re­
form Act goes further with respect to accountants by imposing on them 
an affirmative obligation to report their clients '  wrongdoing. 127 By estab­
lishing this whistleblowing obligation, Congress directly rej ected the posi­
tion of courts that held, even pre-Central Bank, that silence or inaction 
was an insufficient basis for the imposition of liability upon secondary 
defendants. 1 28 
The significance of the Reform Act extends beyond the provisions 
that deal explicitly with secondary defendants. Indeed, the primary ob­
jective of the Reform Act-reduction of vexatious litigation-is the aspect 
of the Act most relevant to determining the standards of liability for 
outside professionals. As indicated above, Central Bank was motivated by 
the belief that securities li tigation posed a particular risk to secondary 
defendants of vexatious litigation, and that such litigation caused undesir­
able pressure to settle frivolous cases and imposed socially undesirable 
costs upon professionals that might ultimately be borne by their cli­
ents . 129 This same concern was Congress 's  rationale for adopting the Re­
form Act. 1 30 If, however, the Reform Act effectively reformed private se­
curities litigation to reduce or eliminate the problem of vexatious 
litigation, the adoption of the Reform Act may have removed the j ustifica­
tion proffered in Central Bank for narrowing the scope of secondary de-
126. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open Market Securities 
Fraud, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 639, 640 (1996) (describing proportionate liability as "a centerpiece 
proposal for reform, but largely as a mechanism for benefiting the collateral participant 
(usually accountants and lawyers) "). 
127. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 301, Pub. L. No. 1 04-67, 
109 Stat. 737, 762-64 (adding§ l OA to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78a). 
128. Cf. Jeanne Calderon & Rachel Kowal, Auditors Whistle an Unhappy Tune, 75 
Denv. U. L. Rev. 419, 430-31 (1998) (arguing that Reform Act's creation of new disclosure 
obligations for accountants may impose sufficient duty to impose liability for failure to 
blow the whistle on client fraud). 
129. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 189. 
1 30. See Harrison, supra note 71, at 533. 
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fendant liability. 1 3 1  In other words, the policy rationale for Central Bank 
may no longer justify the result. 
This possibility is particularly important because the Central Bank de­
cision itself recognized that choosing an appropriate liability rule creates 
a tension between two competing objectives: protecting the ability of 
outside professionals to serve their clients and protecting investors. As 
the Central Bank Court noted, expansive liability for securities p rofession­
als raises concerns about abusive litigation, and the costs and settlement 
pressures associated with such litigation . 1 32 These costs may be passed on 
to the client and may ultimately prevent some clients from obtaining the 
benefit of professional services. Without the assistance of outside profes­
sionals to explain disclosure requirements, formulate appropriate lan­
guage, review documentation for consistency with industry standards, and 
so forth, issuers would be less able to meet the regulatory disclosure stan­
dards. In addition, the risk of litigation may cause outside p rofessionals 
to perform their services in a way that minimizes their liability exposure 
at the expense of more complete service to the client. It  is necessary for 
outside professionals to become intimately involved in the disclosure pro­
cess in order to serve their clients effectively. A liability rule that encour­
ages professionals to limit their participation in preparing client disclo­
sure may therefore undercut the disclosure process. 1 33 These problems 
can directly undermine the obj ective of federal securities regulation:  full  
and fair disclosure of all material information . 1 34 
At the same time, the securities disclosure system is premised upon 
the supposition that outside professionals will be involved in the disclo­
sure process . The statutory scheme relies, in part, on this involvement as 
a substitute for greater supervision by government regulators. 1 35 Inves­
tors also view the involvement of reputable professionals as a signal that 
the issuer's disclosure is reliable. l 36 Outside professionals thus function 
as gatekeepers who prevent improper transactions from obtaining the ap­
pearance of regularity necessary to attract investment funds. This struc­
ture may be efficient in that outside professionals may be m ore readily 
1 3 1 .  Indeed, the advent of legislative reform may remove the justification for the 
Supreme Court's general use of textualism to narrow the scope of private securities 
litigation. 
1 32. See Central Bank, 5 1 1 U.S. at 1 89 .  
1 33. See City Bar Amicus Brief in  Klein, supra note 64, at 1 3-14 (explaining that 
inappropriate liability standard could interfere with the effectiveness of the disclosure 
process). 
1 34. See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 ,  687 ( 1 985) (describing 
Congress's remedial purpose of providing full and fair disclosure in enacting the federal 
securities laws). 
1 35. See, e.g., City Bar Amicus Brief in Central Bank, supra note 25 (describing 
gatekeeping role of outside professionals in assuring proper functioning of federal 
securities laws and investor reliance upon that role). 
1 36. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 5 1 ,  at 386 (" [I] t is the securities lawyer who 
controls the disclosure process and who undertakes to align the interests of the client 
issuer with the client's investors."). 
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able to access client information than regulators. Lax liability standards 
interfere with the incentive of professionals to perform this gatekeeping 
function by allowing professionals to sacrifice investor protection in favor 
of maintaining a relationship with unscrupulous clients .  
Although the Court in Central Bank left open the door with respect 
to liability of outside professionals, the decision demonstrated a j udicial 
inability or unwillingness to attempt to balance these policy concerns. In 
formulating a rule of primary liability for secondary defendants, lower 
courts may be able to address this omission and to effect a compromise 
between the two competing goals. With the advent of legislative reform, 
the courts' task is simplified. To the extent that the Reform Act has re­
duced the exposure of outside professionals to vexatious litigation, 1 37 
courts have the leeway to adopt a liability rule that places greater empha­
sis on the gatekeeping function without subj ecting professionals to exces­
sive litigation risk. 
Moreover, the structure of the Reform Act suggests that Congress 
intended for the courts to perform this function. Rather than specify the 
circumstances under which outside professionals should be liable in pri­
vate litigation, Congress adopted a framework under which the courts are 
required to make this determination on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, 
although Congress has endorsed liability for secondary defendants, the 
Reform Act leaves for the courts the j ob of fi ne-tuning such liability con­
sistent with the statutory goals that place primary importance on full and 
fair disclosure138 and the protection of investors. 1 39 
The recent adoption of the Uniform Standards Act lends additional 
support to this position. Although the Reform Act reduced the liability 
exposure of secondary defendants under federal law, it was still  possible 
for plaintiffs to bring state court actions based upon state blue sky laws or 
common law fraud. Many states applied generous liability rules to j oint 
tortfeasors that could undercut the protection of the proportionate liabil­
ity provision. 140 Indeed, immediately after the adoption of the Reform 
Act, plaintiffs filed a number of securities fraud suits in state court, pre-
1 37.  Early analyses suggest that the Reform Act is effectively achieving this result. For 
example, the SEC's preliminary post-Reform Act statistics revealed a dramatic decline in 
the number of outside professionals named as defendants in securities fraud litigation. 
See Richard H. Walker et al., The New Securities Class Action: Federal Obstacles, State 
Detours, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 641 ,  65 1 ( 1 997) (describing statistical differences in suits filed 
against accountants, attorneys, and underwriters before and after the Reform Act). 
1 38. See, e.g., Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 ( 1 977) 
(primary purpose of federal securities laws is to implement "a philosophy of full 
disclosure"). 
1 39. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 1 80, 1 86 ( 1 963) 
(holding that one of the principal purposes of federal securities regulation is protection of 
investors). 
1 40. See, e.g., Thomas W. Antonucci, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
and the States: Who Will Decide the Future of Securities Litigation?, 46 Emory LJ. 1 237, 
1 253-54 ( 1 997) (describing how state law, which generally provides for joint and several 
liability, allows plaintiffs to avoid the proportionate liability limitation of the Reform Act) 
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sumably for the purpose of exploring the extent to which state court<; and 
state law offered a viable substitute for federal securities l itigation. 1 4 1  
These suits did n o t  appear, however, t o  b e  efforts t o  circumven t  the pro­
portionate liability provision of the Act.142 
The Uniform Standards Act effectively eliminates this substitute liti­
gation.  By providing exclusive federal court j urisdiction for all private 
class action litigation arising from fraudulent securities transactions, the 
Act secures the previously adopted litigation reforms for secondary de­
fendants in virtually all cases involving large scale damage claims.  Thus, 
the Uniform Standards Act supplements the Reform Act in p roviding 
more complete application of the provisions aimed at reducing vexatious 
litigation. At the same time, the Uniform Standards Act ensures that the 
federal courts will be the ultimate authority on the circumstances under 
which it is appropriate to hold secondary defendants accoun table . 1 43 
As a consequence of the recent legislation, courts that curren tly are 
faced with the question of how to determine the scope of l iability for 
outside professionals have information available beyond the original text 
of section lO (b) to assist them in that task. Congress has explicitly stated 
that it is appropriate to impose liability on lawyers, accountants, and in­
vestment banks, and that such liability is consistent with the purposes of 
the statute . Indeed, Congress has affirmed the propriety of imposing 
such liability within the context of private civil l itigation. The recent leg­
islation indicates congressional desire to have outside professionals  serve 
a gatekeeping role in the securities industry. Appropriate liability rules 
further that obj ective. Finally, the legislative structure authorizes the 
141. See, e.g., Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State 
Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 273 (1998) (describing various post­
Reform Act empirical studies measuring increase in state court securities litigation and 
explaining how state court suits could allow plaintiffs to avoid some of the reforms adopted 
by the Reform Act). 
142. See Walker, supra note 137, at 678 (observing that initial state court suits filed 
after the Reform Act did not seem to be aimed at "peripheral deep pocket defendants"). 
143. A distinct component of the Uniform Standards Act further supports reading it 
as a congressional affirmation of broad judicial lawmaking authority. The Reform Act 
raised some question about whether Congress intended to change the judicially developed 
standard for establishing scienter under section 10 (b). See Robert A. Prentice, The Future 
of Corporate Disclosure: The Internet, Securities Fraud, and Rule 10b-5, 47 Emory LJ. 1, 
50-51 (1998) (discussing judicial disagreement over whether Reform Act eliminated 
liability for reckless conduct). In response to concerns expressed by the SEC, Congress 
expressly stated in the legislative history of the Uniform Standards Act that it did not 
intend to change the recklessness standard. See The Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1988, S. Rep. No. 105-182, at 4 (1998) (" [T]he Committee emphasizes 
that the clear intent in 1995 and our continuing intent in this legislation is that neither 
PSLRA nor S. 1260 in any way alters the scienter standard in federal securities fraud 
suits."); Rachel Witmer, Litigation Reform: SEC Throws Weight Behind Reform Bill, 30 
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 477 (1998) (describing congressional response to SEC's 
concerns). Notably, rather than adopting its own substantive standard, Congress again 
expressed its approval of the standard crafted by the federal courts. 
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courts to develop those liability rules and, in so doing, to consider the 
objectives and policies inherent in federal securities regulation. 
Acknowledging the significance of the recent legislation does not 
free the lower courts from hard choices. It does, however, suggest that 
some lower courts such as the Second Circuit in Wright are taking an 
unnecessarily restrictive approach by requiring that a defendant actually 
make a fraudulent statement in order to incur primary liability. Even 
decisions like Klein, which rely on a broad conception of who is a speaker, 
may have been unduly constrained by the effort to limit primary liability 
to defendants who are the speakers or authors of misleading statements. 
Such a liability rule does not recognize the substantial and important role 
played by securities professionals in the preparation of disclosure docu­
ments. Nor does it take cognizance of the importance of encouraging a 
close and candid relationship between the professional and his client. 
Finally, the liability rule fails to consider the importance of securities pro­
fessionals as gatekeepers and effectively allows unscrupulous professionals 
to insulate themselves from liability at the expense of investor protection. 
As future courts struggle to answer the questions left unresolved by Cen­
tral Bank, the foregoing policies should enable them to formulate a stan­
dard more faithful to the statutory purposes. 
This conclusion is strikingly consistent with William Cary's vision of 
the appropriate role for the federal courts in interpreting the federal se­
curities laws. Decisions written by Cary on behalf of the SEC, such as the 
Cady, Roberts decision, 1 44 as well as the SEC's advocacy position in cases 
like Borak, 1 45 illustrate Cary's view that the federal courts should interpret 
the federal securities laws broadly to further the remedial goals of inves­
tor and market protection. Cary's legacy continues to be felt, as the fed­
eral courts have become entrenched in the role of developing the federal 
securities laws and, in many cases, have accepted Cary's ideas about the 
appropriate statutory goals. Cary's legacy gave federal securities regula­
tion a structure that maintains a delicate balance between investor protec­
tion and excessive liability exposure. Recent legislation demonstrates a 
congressional commitment, in large part, to the contours of that balance, 
and to the preservation of the regulatory structure envisioned by Cary. 
To the extent that Central Bank's textualist approach argues against this 
structure, it threatens the fundamental policy objectives of the securities 
laws. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Court has never formally repudiated its decision in JI. 
Case v. Borak, since that time it has retreated from the general approach 
espoused by William Cary, both by reducing its willingness to recognize 
implied private rights of action and by rejecting its formerly expansive 
1 44. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 ( 1 961). 
1 45. J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 ( 1 964). 
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remedial interpretation of the federal securities laws in favor of greater 
adherence to the statutory text. The Court's  strict textualist approach 
reached a peak in the Central Bank decision, in which the Court con­
cluded that the statute failed to provide a private right of action against 
those who aid and abet securities fraud. 
The Central Bank Court left to lower courts the task of developing 
standards for when secondary defendants could nonetheless be held lia­
ble as primary violators, and the challenge of formulating such standards 
within the parameters of the Central Bank decision. Although Central 
Bank seemed to direct courts to take a narrow approach, subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions and, more importantly, recent legislation sug­
gest a return to the remedial principles espoused by Chairman Cary. The 
adoption of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and the 
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 should be read as explicit congressional 
endorsements of private securities l itigation. Moreover, the recent legis­
lation clearly demonstrates Congress's recognition that, despite some 
problems that can be addressed through legislative reform, p rivate l itiga­
tion, including claims of private civil liability of secondary defendants, 
remains an important tool for deterring fraud and protecting i nvestors in 
the U.S.  securities markets. In addressing the scope of liability for secon­
dary defendants, the courts should not sacrifice these concerns in favor of 
rigid adherence to the statutory text. 
• 
